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INTRODUCTION
1
I have been asked to help you launch your Workshop by telling something 
of v/hat I know of disasters and their relationship to development. As 
I am supposed to spark discussion, it was also suggested that I be 
provocative and controversial. In a field where there is an abundance 
of opinion yet a dearth of hard fact, it is easy to be controversial —  
and I certainly propose to be that. But for the many organizations 
represented here which have an interest' in both disaster relief and 
development work, I think that it would be most helpful if I begin by 
setting out some of the ways in which the one can interfere with the 
other. After that, I would like to go on to say something about the
relationship between the voluntary agencies and the Western news media
/and their work in disaster relief abroad.
A NEW Large-scale international disaster assistance is a phenomenon
BUT BIG comparatively recent in the history of welfare provision. Yet in the
BUSINESS
J
25-year period from 1949 to 1973, some 223 major natural disasters 
received international aid. Of these, 45 were earthquakes, 123 floods, 
23 cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons and tidal waves, and 9 were fires. 
Twenty-three others included such phenomena as volcanic eruption, 
drought, extreme cold, avalanche, fire, and snowstorm. The Red Cross 
is quoted as saying that, on average, it launches an international 
appeal for assistance once every 23 days. Indeed, it is the nongovern­
mental! organizations which have played the most conspicuous part in 
major relief operations around the world. But what of the performance 
of these organizations in the field? V/hat are the difficulties they 
encounter in delivering their relief? I would like to review seven
problem areas
PART 1 - OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD
EXAGGERATION
OF
INEQUALITIES
The first broad category of difficulty, and one which is intimately bound 
up with questions of development, is that relief can, and frequently does, 
exacerbate existing differences in wealth and income —  both within a 
given community and among different disaster communities. Persons with 
higher socio-economic status are generally able to take advantage of 
organized relief more than those of lower status. The giving of relief 
tends therefore usually to stratify further the victims' society by 
accentuating existing economic divisions. The reasons for this are 
various.
Isolation by distance and poor communications, or by virtue of language 
differences, illiteracy or cultural suspicion, means that the less well 
off do not have the same access to relief, government aid programs, or 
sources of credit as do their more fortunate brothers. Those who are 
not affiliated in some way with an existing community organization may 
find that they either do not become aware of the availability of relief, 
or that the norms governing the conduct of the program preclude those 
without established community affiliations. Those who do not already 
have a secure income, land or agricultural production to offer as 
collateral will be refused loans to aid them in their recovery. Because 
emergency housing, or loans for rebuilding, are frequently given only to 
those with title to a plot of land, many programs of reconstruction aid 
help only those who are better off to begin with.
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RELIEF 
AS A
DISINCENTIVE 
TO RECOVERY
The second danger associated with relief which impinges on development it 
that the introduction of resources from outside of a community can inhibit 
both psychological recovery and physical reconstruction. People will 
often feign helplessness and delay in providing their own solutions to 
their needs, secure in the belief that relief aid will be distributed to 
them if they are still without provision when the allocation is made.
If this continues for more than a very brief period, then the requesting 
of relief comes to be seen as a normal and reasonable solution to the 
problems of daily living. Especially where aid is given away for free, 
the agency is identified in the mind of the recipient as a patr6n —  
one who is to be looked to for assistance in solving any and all kinds 
of difficulty. Traditional self-reliant measures for coping with 
disaster are then foregone in favor of accepting the new relief.
Not only may people refrain from doing for themselves what is needed for 
recovery from the abnormal event, they may actually destroy what little 
they are left with after the disaster in order to be first to qualify 
for free relief. Other victims may leave off doing what would normally 
be reouired for survival even if there had not been a disaster. For 
example, free food distributions have caused earthquake victims to 
ne -lcct the harvesting of their own crops in favor of waiting in line 
for relief agency rations. The result of this can only be oo increase 
the vulnerability of the population to further disaster•
5RELIEF 
AS A
DISINCENTIVE 
TO PREVENTION
The very process of applying the label "recipient,'* "beneficiary" or 
"refugee" classifies people as objects of concern and pity. The role 
associations which go along with the words tend to condemn these people 
to a passive state, one which is defined by and manipulated by the 
relief agency. This process denies the victim that very scope for 
initiative and self-help which is so essential to recovery. It is a 
subtle process, innocent in perpetration and one which can sit comfortably 
•with the victim. But a situation of dependency can be created which is 
subsequently very difficult to break. The problem is not so much that 
the victims are given goods and services which they could equally well 
provide for themselves, but that in offering easy and immediate solutions 
to need, longer-term strategies for problem-solving are made to appear 
less attractive, and are inevitably delayed.
Not only may relief inhibit self-reliance during and after an emergency, 
but the knowledge that relief will be given in times of hardship can have 
the effect of dissuading people from taking action to protect themselves 
before an event. A property owner who is confident that the Red Cross 
or some other local agency will compensate for losses after a flood, is 
not likely to be drawn to the idea of preventing damage by taking costly 
measures himself. Similarly, the knowledge that gifts, low-interest 
loans or subsidized services will be made available by government and 
other relief agencies, has been known to encourage people both to remain 
in vulnerable areas, and to be less enthusiastic about farming and 
obtaining an income generally.
6RELIEF AS A 
DISTRACTION 
FROM
DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVITIES
REINFORCING
THE
STATUS QUO
A third danger is that the availability of relief works, labor projects 
and supplemental allowances of all kinds —  especially food —  can have 
the effect of attracting people from non-disaster areas and away from 
other worthwhile activities. Labor for necessary agricultural work can 
be put into short supply; and voluntary work on non-aided projects of 
community improvement can be abandoned in favor of those projects which 
are financed or assisted by a relief agency. Emergency work programs 
have also been known to interfere with school attendance by offering 
unusual opportunities to increase family income. Where the daily wage 
offered on a relief work project is more than the normal rate in the 
locality for agricultural work, then this too may have the effect of 
attracting labor away from normal productive activities. Artificially 
inflated wage rates increase expectations which carry over beyond the 
end of an emergency. This may or may not be considered desirable, 
depending on one's economic and social perspective.
A fourth danger is that the giving of relief can work against development 
objectives by tending to solidify the status quo. In an attempt to 
establish rapid means for the distribution of resources, relief agencies 
often alight on those local officials, dignitaries and locally influential 
individuals who can, through their good offices, ensure that facilities, 
personnel and community cooperation are obtained without delay. From 
the relief agency's point of view, such people usually have the added 
advantage that they speak the same language, share the same assumptions, 
and belong to the same social class as do the relief agency officials 
themselves. Communications between the donors and their local agents
7are thereby much simplified. Yet, in selecting already powerful indi­
viduals to act as its agents v/ithin the victim community, the relief 
agency adds strength to the local elite.
Control over the distribution of relief is a political instrument which 
can be used in the search for social prestige, economic gain and political 
allies. Those in need are inevitably drawn to the dispensers of goods 
and services, and are likely to find themselves paying tribute —  in 
humility or favor, if not in cash or kind —  for the privilege of 
receiving their rightful ration. For their own convenience, or simply 
in an attempt to smooth what they perceive of as flaws in the distribution 
system, the appointed agents may be tempted to impose additional, non­
official requirements on the recipients, to be complied with before aid 
is given. This too has the effect of strengthening the local power 
against unsuspecting and frequently illiterate beneficiaries.
HASTE AND 
IGNORANCE 
COMBINE IN
SECONDARY
DISASTERS
The fifth danger is that the precipitous speed with which emergency 
decisions are made does not allow for adequate analysis of the problems 
addressed or for study of the likely social and environmental effects of 
those decisions. Arrangements are made, for example, for the building 
of emergency housing, refugee camps, or community facilities, without 
an adequate view of how the design, siting and method of construction will 
affect long-term patterns of recovery. An organization which makes a 
fleeting visit to a disaster-affected community, without knowing anything 
of its history, culture or ongoing social system, is quite likely to end 
up making matters worse than they would have been otherwise.
8USURPING
LOCAL
AUTONOMY
DISTORTION
OF
TRADITIONAL 
PATTERNS OF 
REST ONSlNIl.r
A sixth and most important point in this series, is that the high degree 
of centralization which is often associated with relief operations tends 
to remove what little decision-making power is normally vested with commu­
nity leaders and local government authorities. Many non-governmental 
aid organizations —  especially those without ongoing local representa­
tion in the disaster area —  are prone to usurp local autonomy by intro­
ducing large and unprecedented resources which no local leader can ever 
hope to compete with. Overnight, the outside aid organization becomes 
a political force in the local social economy, of which, sadly, it is 
all too often completely ignorant. The dangers are threefold. Firstly, 
by effectively removing the power of decision from local leaders, these 
people are denied their usual legitimacy before the populace. If a good 
job is done, the credit accrues to the relief organization and not to 
the leaders. Secondly, by taking responsibility itself for the relief 
works, an agency denies the opportunity to local officials to gain 
experience in the management of their community's own recovery.
Precipitous assistance in the short term —  which places a high value 
on immediate effectiveness —  may in fact deny the victims the opportunity 
to prepare to cope with future disasters which will inevitably befall them.
The seventh and final danger to be mentioned here, is that as government 
or outside agencies appear to take on responsibility for relief and 
reconstruction, it becomes popularly accepted that that is indeed where 
the locus of responsibility not only does, but should lie. What is done 
: by a victim —  person, village, town, or country —  in response to their 
own felt needs, will be conditioned by what they believe to be the
o  ......... ............................ ^ . '■
responsibility of other parties. This, in turn, will be influenced by
i
a perception of others' resources in relation to their own* Where 
government or relief agency enters upon the scene and proceeds to 
display its wealth, it is not surprising that the victims conclude 
that the responsibility for recovery lies best v/ith the well-endowed 
helpers. The more conspicuous is the aid, the stronger is the victims' 
belief that the aid organizations will do all. In turn then, the more 
difficult is it for the aid organizations to resist the newly created 
expectations that it is they who have responsibility for improving the 
victims' lot. But the resources at the disposal of all relief agencies 
are likely to amount only to a small fraction of the total need. In
\ appearing to shift the locus of responsibility from the people to the 
agencies, the latter can therefore only create illusions, delay the 
recovery process, and set the scene for later disappointment and 
recrimination.
9
WHO IS TO Having reviewed the dangers to development which are activated with
MAKE THE relief, it must not be assumed that working for long-term goals is,
CHOICES? prima facie, better than catering to the satisfaction of immediate wants.
Choices must be made on the basis of value preferences. Hov/ever, the 
important thing is that conscious choices.are made, and that they are
10
GOOD 
AND BAD 
RELIEF
made at appropriate points in the social system, not left to chance 
factors at the whim of one particular decision-maker, or one particular 
agency. Actual and planned programs of relief must be subject to analysis 
to determine the trade-off relationships between objectives formed 
according to short-term and long-term goals. The fact that the aid 
policies of any one agency can intimately affect the performance in the 
field of any other agency, implies that inter-agency collaboration in 
this process is essential. However, the matter of who gets to make the 
decisions on which time perspective is more important, is a key question 
in social policy. Among the melee of would-be helpers, each with his 
or her own time horizons, objectives and methods, a coordination mechanism 
must intervene to ensure that the victims themselves have a voice in 
determining what kind of recovery they want, and when.
Although I have painted a picture which contrasts development with relief 
in rather black and white terms, I have done this because I would like 
everyone to be aware of the dangers, and not because I want to castigate 
the giving of relief per se. From the development perspective, there are 
good and bad ways of delivering relief. They are not all equally harmful^ 
Indeed, with good planning and a careful selection of objectives it is 
often possible to achieve in both directions simultaneously.
However, in setting up a relief program which is sensitive to development, 
a key policy question is always: When does the agency wish to see the
benefits materialize? For each of the possible needs which can be
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addressed, there is a range of alternative methods which yield benefits 
in the short, medium or long term. The agency can give people food or 
building materials today, or it can enable them to increase production 
of these things for tomorrow; it can set up temporary work projects to 
put money into pockets now, or it can stimulate economic development to 
give people employment in the future. An agency can set up emergency 
distribution channels —  for food, etc. —  or it can concentrate on 
strengthening the marketing apparatus and/or local institutions to handle 
available supplies through the normal and ongoing socio-economic system. 
Similarly, the agency can attempt to organize the victims to solve their 
own problems, or it can aim to encourage local leadership, administrative 
skills, self-confidence, and social solidarity so that the people will 
be better couipped to organize themselves on subsequent ocaasions.
The pursuit of the short-term options requires acumen in the field of 
.logistics. The pursuit of the long-term options requires a much more 
diverse range of skills and a much longer-term commitment to the 
community.
PART 2 - BEING CONTENTIOUS
many of the problems encountered in the field by large non-governmental 
relief organizations arc traceable, directly or indirectly, to their 
source of funding. As an epilogue to this paper, I would like to examine 
phis, and the special relationship which voluntary aid agencies have to
the sources of -.onular news and information
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Those relief agencies which are supported by voluntary contributions from 
the public depend for their continued existence on a public appreciation 
of their v;or’.:. This is generated primarily through the activities of the 
mass media —  film, radio, television, and the press. Indeed, in the more 
developed countries, the donor public is likely to obtain its information 
ar.d understanding of natural disasters entirely through the last two 
sources. The electronic media especially have tremendous power of image 
formation, with the ability to create instant and sympathetic identifica­
tion with the victims' plight. As coverage from all corners of the globe 
becomes possible, disasters which would formerly have been of purely local 
significance, now take on international meaning. Portrayals of disasters 
in the less developed countries probably have the effect of making people 
in the rich countries more world-community-minded, and this is no doubt 
to be viewed positively.
Nevertheless, it must be observed that the view of Third World disasters 
enjoyed by the general public and by most of the relief organizations in 
the rich world is filtered through Western, middle-class values and beliefs 
of a highly ethnocentric nature. News-gathering and broadcasts focus on 
those aspects of the disaster which are easily visible. The actual 
destruction- is thereby exaggerated and the arrival of aid is heralded as 
the cure to the country's problems. Victims are portrayed as passive, 
dazed, helpless and inarticulate individuals who simply wait for things to 
be done for them. The government is frequently assumed to be disorganized 
and corrupt. The fact that these stereotypes fit well the typical Western 
view of the "natives" of poor countries is probably no accident. The
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tereotypes also contrast well with the popular image of the relief
agency —  one which is capable, active, sensitive, resourceful, organized, 
and compassionate* Educating the general public in the economics, sociology 
and social psvchology of disaster events is a difficult and time-consuming 
task and one which the news media are not, in any case, equipped to under­
take. But even if journalists and television correspondents have the 
educational preparation and insight themselves to perceive the true nature 
of the phenomenon upon which they are reporting, the political constraints 
and/or the commercial competition under which their network operates 
usually prevent the presentation of news reports which are anything but 
sensationalist in content and stereotypical in form*
\ nte R-AGEMC'/
COMPETITION
REINFORCES
SIMPLISTIC
APPEALS
An understanding of the role of the news media in disaster situations is 
helpful in view of the fact that relief organizations, primarily non­
governmental but also donor governmental agencies, are obliged to compete 
for media attention with other similar organizations attempting to attract 
contributions for basically similar ends. In order to do this, relief 
organizations must cooperate with the news media in projecting those
stereotypical images of need which will publicly justify their involve­
ments. They must then launch some project which purports to address the 
problems, and project an image of this in such a way that the particular 
agency is identified as especially worthy of public support. Finally, to 
ensure support for its programs in the future, the agency must take advan­
tage of the news media, as well as its own publicity, to project post-facto 
accounts —  usually highly edited —  describing its activities.
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DEJECT:' 
RATI IE A V 
SU2J£CT':
~ l m u .; 1; bo noted that in the whole of this process, the relief agency is 
v.l no • >\int answerable to the victims whom it purports to serve. Victims 
have no voice in relief agency affairs and no vehicle for expressing their 
views before their benefactors.. The relief agency is accountable, if at 
all, to its donor public, through the imprecise and corruptive influence 
of Lhe news ;.:cdia. This state of affairs reveals itself in several ways.
Lb
ACCOddiEG 
S ALGAE ILL'
r\V.'
EOT ME V
First, different types of natural disaster attract different degrees of 
response from the relief agencies according to their saleability as horror 
stories. Earthquakes, for example, although of relatively minor signifi­
cance in terms of their annual death toll when compared to other forms of 
disaster, attract considerably more attention and therefore more aid 
resources than do other types of sudden catastrophe. Those disasters with 
slow onset and relatively long duration —  primarily drought and famine 
conditions —  attract less publicity and aid than do those disasters 
bavin., a sudden onset. It can also be observed that those disasters which 
strike cities, or which occur in countries geographically proximate to, 
or enjoying economic and political ties with the donor country, are more 
likely to attract attention than those which affect rural areas, remote 
, re as, or politically insignificant parts of the world.
yn she field, the effort to fulfill aid stereotypes is no less conspicuous. 
Medical scans are dispatched; emergency housing units are donated; and 
:dr transport is utilized to a much greater extent than is strictly neces­
sitated by the event. That aid which can be easily portrayed in photo- 
r.inlis, on television and in film, is particularly appropriate for the
relief agency’s public relations needs. Scenes of donations being made 
to representatives of the recipient community; scenes of food being 
distributed to waiting lines of children; and scenes of medical staff (in 
uniform) applying injections to (usually naked) victims, all enhance the 
saleability of the relief operation to the donor public. That aid which 
is not capable of being photographed —  advance planning, disaster impact 
studies, or psychological counseling for example —  is inherently less 
attractive to the donor agency. For the same reasons, high-technology, 
capital-intensive items —  helicopters, field hospitals, and experimental 
"emergency housing" units for example —  provide convenient gimmicks which 
add visible point to the agency*s mission.
A related and third phenomenon, is that agencies tend to select those types 
of aid -which can be easily counted or measured. The number of housing 
units, or square feet of housing installed; the number of mouths fed; the 
tons of commodities delivered; or the number of volunteers in the field
are all useful figures in the campaign to attract public attention and 
create confidence in the donor countries that something constructive is 
being done.
The fourth effect of a donor orientation rather than a recipient orienta-N
tion, is that most foreign relief agencies focus their efforts on attempting 
to respond to what they believe are urgent but short-term needs. For the 
most part, these are the areas which require dramatic activity of the kind
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short-lived that they can be taken care of by brief expeditions of mercyo 
Also, although some of the needs may be urgent, it is in fact usually 
impossible for foreign organizations to respond to these needs with the 
necessary speed —  at least after a sudden-impact disaster.
DISINCENTIVE The fifth effect of a donor orientation is that relief agencies find thern- 
TO selves competing with one another for social credit. There is therefore
COORDIl.'ATIOd every incentive for agencies to refuse to collaborate with one another or 
to accept coordination. The result is a waste of resources, and a certain 
amount of inter-agency conflict from which the victims suffer.
NEGLECTING 
DISASTER * 
PREVIliTi’TCh
The sixth and final effect of a donor rather than recipient orientation, 
is that v/hile international relief agencies are bound by a limited public 
understanding of what the problems are to which they address themselves, 
they are unlikely to respond to needs in pre-disaster planning —  either 
for prevention or preparedness. There are many activities within the pre- 
disaster and reconstruction contexts which are as yet beyond local 
capacities, and which could benefit from international assistance.
However, without public education programs in the more developed countries, 
it will be impossible for aid organizations, especially the voluntary ones, 
to refocus their energies on policies which could have long-term benefits.
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SOME QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1) l/hat is more ir.r .ortant: trying to alleviate suffering today or working for 
its oreventicn in the future? If both are important, and only one is 
possible, which takes precedence?
2) foes the concentration of suffering in one place and at one time justify 
aid-giving policies which are different from those used at normal times?
If so, why?
3) Do the criteria which we use for assessing the suitability of relief projects 
differ from those we use for development projects? If so, why?
4) V/hat Cure the strengths —  pertinent to relief —  of our individual voluntary
aid agencies?
U) V/hat are the weaknesses —  pertinent to relief —  of our agencies?
C) Are there ways in which voluntary agencies can complement each others' skills?
7) How fast (or slow) can our agencies move to deliver help in the field?
3) How much influence or control do project beneficiaries have over the decision­
making —  In Canada —  which affects their futures?
0) V/hat means do we ’nave for learning of the effects of our disaster aid on the 
physical, social and economic environments?
1C) how well enuinpeu are we with sensitive and reliable representatives who know 
what is , ■ oin on in the field? How do we know that they know?
11) In launching appeals for specific disasters, do we add weight to an "event- 
centereu" awareness on the part of the Canadian public? Could we develop a 
public consciousness of the ongoing and recurrent nature of disasters in 
poor countries?
12) VJhat efforts do we make to educate officials of the mass media in disaster 
and development issues? What educative influence do we have over the 
Canadian Lroadcacting Corporation?
Id) Do we reswonZ to disaster events with an eye to the public relations appeal
—  in Canada —  of a particular type of aid?
1 4 ) go we allow the need for figures describing our achievements to influence
the design of our emergency projects?
15) Do vie as voluntary agencies compete with one another for funds? If so, does 
this fact influence our disaster response policies?
] ■ <) what attention do we give to disaster prevention; and to disaster prepared­
ness? If little, soul i wo like to find out more?
International Disaster Specialists
1NTERTECT
P. O. Box 10502 
Dallas, Texas 75207 U.S.A. 
Tel.: (214) 521-8921
INTERTECT is an international firm of consultants which specializes in 
problems associated with disaster relief and reconstruction. Scattered 
worldwide, there are nine Consultants and approximately twenty-five 
Associates operating within the network. Each has his or her own 
professional concern and an ongoing commitment to the field of disaster 
relief and/or prevention planning. Established in 1971, INTERTECT 
provides specialist support to those relief and development agencies 
which seek to be more effective in their humanitarian work. Five 
types of service are available: (1) counseling in the design and
management of disaster-related programs; (2) technical assistance 
which answers agencies' special needs; (3) the mounting of evaluation 
studies; (4) the provision of training in disaster management; and 
(5) the dissemination of information and experience concerning relief 
and reconstruction in the field.
Alan Taylor is a member of INTERTECT and an Associate of the Institute 
for Environmental Studies at the University of Toronto. His training 
has been in the fields of Public Health, Social Anthropology, and the 
Sociology of Development —  the last two degrees obtained from the 
University of Sussex in England. Since 1967 he has been actively 
en -aged in disaster relief and rural development work, and now 
operates as a free-lance consultant in evaluation and organizational 
development to agencies working in these areas.
